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The Idea of Moral Panic - Ten Dimensions of Dispute 
 
 
Matthew David, Amanda Rohloff, Julian Petley, and Jason Hughes 
 
 
Abstract: This paper explores the open and contested concept of moral panic over its 
forty year history, exploring the contributions made by the concept’s key originators, 
as well as contemporary researchers. Whilst most moral panic researchers are critical, 
humanist, interpretivist, interventionist and qualitative this paper highlights ten areas 
of productive dispute within and around the meaning of moral panic theory’s 
‘common sense’. Such diversity of interpretation creates multiple possibilities for 
convergent and divergent theorization and research within a supposedly singular 
conceptual framework. This lack of closure and consequent diversity of political 
standpoints, intellectual perspectives, and fields of empirical focus; rather than 
representing the weakness of the concept of moral panic, reflects and contributes to its 
successful diffusion, escalation and innovation. 
 
Keywords: Audience Effects, Deviancy Amplification, Folk Devils, Media, Moral 
Panic(s), Regulation 
 
 
 
 
It is four decades since the emergence of the concept of moral panic. The meaning of 
the term was not fixed at its inception and it remains open to interpretation and 
contestation today (as it should be). This is not to say that the term had or has no 
coherence. Moral panic research continues to invert the traditional focus away from 
the deficiencies of the deviant and attends more to the definers of deviance, the 
labellers rather than to those labelled (as well as looking at the interplay between the 
‘deviants’, the agents of social control, the media, and the general public). Moral 
panic researchers tend to emphasise qualitative interpretation over quantitative 
measurement, but this is not always so (see Lundström in this volume for example).  
For some researchers, the agency of moral entrepreneurs is accorded a central role in 
the creation of moral panics, even as moral panics are also defined most typically 
through their relationship with dominant social structures and in the protection of 
powerful institutions.  Others explore the relationship between wider social processes 
on the one hand, and the intentional actions and campaigns of people on the other.  
Many moral panic researchers work towards the exposure of relations of power, and 
as such they reject a simplistic consensus model of society and any strongly positivist 
conception of the role of social science in society. Yet, this is not to say moral panic 
researchers can agree on what the underlying relations of power in society are, or how 
best to challenge them. From its earliest manifestations (Cohen, 1972; Young, 1971a, 
1971b) differences have existed concerning what constitutes a moral panic, the 
boundaries of the term ‘moral’ in this context, and what should be understood by the 
term ‘panic’. A myriad of further differences streamed forth as the term matured and 
proliferated within the social sciences and beyond into the wider world, not least into 
the language of the media itself.  
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Taken together, the work of Chris Jenks, Stan Cohen, Jock Young, Chas Critcher, 
Catharine Lumby & Nina Funnell, Julia Pearce & Elizabeth Charman, and Ragnar 
Lundström, illustrates the terrain across which the term moral panic has travelled and 
highlights its productivity in all its coherences and divergences, the insights and 
disputes that have marked its history, and its present condition within sociology and 
beyond. Ten such domains of insight and dispute present themselves most clearly in 
the work of the above authors. These will be set out over the following few pages as 
follows: (1) The relationship between moral panic, regulation, normalization and 
socialization as well as the question of whether some moral panics threaten rather 
than reinforce the hegemonic order; (2) The scope for moral panics to be generated 
against actors who are not marginalized underdogs; (3) The possibility that some 
moral panics can be ‘good’ relative to the claim that ‘panic’, in this context, has 
generally implied an incorrect and irrational over-reaction; (4) The shifting scope of 
the term moral panic, particularly its extension to cover themes that might not initially 
seem primarily moral in character — such as health scares and environmental 
protection; (5) The extent of continuity or change, both in the media industries that 
are said to encourage the production of moral panics, and in wider society; (6) The 
capacity for moral panic theory to hold to the principle of ‘disproportionality’ as a 
measure by which social, media and legal reactions to supposed threats can be judged 
either reasonable or unreasonable panics; (7) The measure of audience reaction and/or 
media influence on policy makers; (8) The definition of success when assessing 
whether or not a moral panic has taken place at all; (9) The ability of moral panic 
researchers to intervene effectively in media and political processes, how they set 
about doing so, and the meaning of such interventions; and finally; (10) The 
relationship between moral panics and the folk devils which they construct, or as 
some have suggested increasingly do not construct.  
 
1. Moral Panics and Moral Regulation 
 
The papers presented in this special issue highlight one of the most productive 
tensions to have survived the life of the moral panic concept itself, namely (a) the 
extent to which moral panics can be understood as reactions by elites and/or interest 
groups to particular threats to the dominant social order, and (b) the degree to which 
moral panics can also be grass roots and/or interest group affairs that may or may not 
act to bolster dominant regimes of everyday moral regulation (see also Hier, 2002a; 
2008; forthcoming). Cohen suggests in his article that a key feature of contemporary 
society is the increasing involvement of social movements, identity politics, and 
victim advocates within moral panics, involving a growing number of new moral 
entrepreneurs, including sociologists and feminists, and a growing scope for such 
non-traditional moral entrepreneurs to gain media exposure. Combined with his 
suggestion that some moral panics can be seen as good, and his belief in the legitimate 
extension of the term to a range of issues (in particular, environmental crimes, 
corporate crimes, and crimes of the state) beyond what might traditionally have been 
the domain of moral panic research (and its investigations into familiar subjects such 
as obscenity, intoxication, and violence), Cohen not only suggests that moral panics 
have proliferated in recent years, but that they are increasingly diverse in being both 
for and against the maintenance of the status quo.  
 
This view stands in strong contrast to that articulated by Critcher, both in this volume 
and in his other writings (2003, 2009). For Critcher the concept of moral panic is best 
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understood in the context of relations of power and regulation. Both Cohen and 
Critcher are in agreement that it is essential for the term moral panic to be understood 
within a broader conceptual framework, rather than simply as a free floating term to 
be applied to label any expression of outrage or concern whose validity a researcher 
may seek to question. However, Cohen stops some way short of adopting Critcher’s 
suggestion that part of such a framework should be the restriction of the term moral 
panic to those forms of misrepresentation by which elites reinforce dominant 
regulative practices by means of scapegoating outsiders and underdogs. In addition, 
Cohen accepts the possibility of counter-hegemonic moral panics whereas Critcher 
does not. Critcher suggests the need to map not only the politics of moral panics, but 
also the economic factors that limit or promote the scope for moral panic 
development. Contra Cohen, Critcher maintains that there is a need for a more 
integrated structural account of moral panics. 
 
Moral panic theorists in the United States (such as Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994) have 
proposed a ‘pluralist’ conception of moral panics that goes considerably beyond 
Cohen’s more bounded willingness to accept the possibility of moral panics that 
challenge elites. Goode and Ben-Yehuda suggest that panics are as likely to come 
from popular mass hysteria as from elite manipulations. On Cohen’s left flank, as it 
were, Critcher’s Marxist critical stance (see also Hier, 2002b) goes even further than 
Cohen in asserting the essential relationship between moral panic, mainstream media 
and the reproduction of hegemonic authority. The tension between interpretivist and 
structuralist critiques of social order is most explicit in the difference between these 
writers, but this also points to an unresolved contradiction at the core of moral panic 
thinking in general. 
 
One final, but thought-provoking point regarding the relationship between moral 
panics and moral regulation comes from Lundström’s account of ‘benefit fraud’ 
discourses in British and Swedish newspapers. Lundström observes that the Swedish 
newspapers which he studied covered the topic in waves of high and low intensity, 
whilst tending to avoid personalized accounts of individual cases, and instead focused 
upon the system and its general tendencies. By contrast, Lundström suggests, the 
British newspapers in his study had no general pattern of high and low coverage, 
exhibiting instead a consistent if somewhat low level of attention to the issue, whilst 
tending towards a focus upon individual cases and the extreme depiction of indolent, 
immoral, and dishonest people being caught, tried, and punished. (On the other hand, 
it does need to be noted that the British press is, from time to time, prone to 
particularly acute bouts of ‘scroungerphobia’, a classic account of which is provided 
by Golding and Middleton [1982].) As such, the very distinction between heightened 
moments of moral panic, with their intense focus on specific folk-devils, and the 
integrative normalization of long-term regulative socialization, seems to disappear in 
the differences of these two cases. Empirical research, even if it does not confirm tidy 
distinctions, does still highlight the productivity of the conceptual prompts that 
initiated it.  
 
2. Was there a Moral Panic Over the Banking Crisis? 
 
The collapse of the so called sub-prime housing market in 2008, and the subsequent 
evaporation of collateral upon which, it turned out, a large part of the banking sector 
was trading, led to a dramatic slowdown in economic activity across the Western 
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world. This economic recession has cost many millions of jobs, led to huge state bail-
out packages, and this transfer of private sector ‘bad’ debt into public sector 
‘sovereign debt’ has seen many ‘advanced’ countries brought to the brink of national 
bankruptcy. Such states have been required to borrow heavily to stabilize their 
currencies and to maintain basic levels of state spending, even whilst the conditions of 
such borrowing have been to cut state spending on a wide range of welfare services. 
Those developed countries that have avoided the need to make emergency 
applications for funds from such bodies as the International Monetary Fund or the 
European Central Bank, have done so only by making or promising to make similarly 
huge cuts to their welfare spending plans. This chain of events has been blamed by 
most people on ‘greedy bankers’. Bankers are said to have been happy to take risks 
when they knew the benefits of winning would be returned to them privately, safe in 
the knowledge that any serious losses arising from such risk taking would be covered 
by the state, because the banks were considered too big, and too crucial to national 
economies, to be allowed to fail.   
 
Bankers have certainly not been ‘flavour of the month’ since 2008, but can we argue 
that there was a moral panic about them? Were they made into elite folk-devils; 
immoral monsters at the very margins of humanity, living by rules that took no 
account of the great majority, whose actions cause great distress, and whose lifestyles 
present an affront to ordinary, everyday, hard-working people who are the wholesome 
‘victims’ of such un-regulated greed? According to Jenks, below, to the rogues’ 
gallery of folk-devils, with its iconic mods and rockers, paedophiles, and drug takers 
can be added the new public enemies of the banker and the expenses-fiddling 
politician. Similarly Cohen suggests that corporate criminals have come to join the 
‘usual suspects’ in society’s panoply of villainy. However, contrary to the views of 
Cohen and Jenks, Critcher suggests that it is not possible for there to have been a 
serious moral panic about bankers as they are too heavily embedded in the dominant 
mode of regulation to be rendered as folk devils in any sustained fashion. Critcher 
(PAGE NUMBER) writes: 
 
Consider fraudsters and speculators. Using the examples of identity theft and investment fraud, 
Michael Levi (2009) has investigated why white collar crimes rarely become the focus of moral 
panics, even when they jeopardise the entire financial system. Above all perhaps, white collar 
crime is not seen as threatening the moral order of society and white collar criminals are too 
powerful to be cast as villains. 
 
For Critcher, and Levi, such white collar criminality is too firmly enmeshed in the 
fabric of the status quo for any campaign to ‘drive them out’ to take off within the 
media or the state apparatus. That rumblings of resentment made the headlines at all 
does beg the question as to how far such limits to ‘banker bashing’ do hold. Just how 
far does such a ‘rumbling’ have to go before it can be said to constitute a moral panic? 
For social scientists that do not preclude grass roots campaigns from being moral 
panics by definition, mass media headlines may not even be a necessary prerequisite 
for a panic, just as their absence may not be sufficient to preclude the possibility of 
one.  
 
Perhaps one of the reasons why some authors are reluctant to consider that there was 
or is a moral panic about bankers is due in part to the debunking, irrational 
connotations associated with the term moral panic.  The banking crisis, like other 
issues such as climate change, may be regarded by some as a ‘real’ issue that is of 
Page 5 of 15 
serious public and indeed global import and is therefore outside the scope of moral 
panic research because concerned and anxious responses are not in the least 
‘disproportionate’.  Indeed, some may argue that we are not reacting enough – that we 
are underreacting instead of overreacting.   
 
 
3. Can Some Moral Panics be Good?  
 
It has been Cohen’s longstanding contention that the term moral panic is, for all its 
utility, problematic in so far as the term ‘panic’ implies an irrational reaction that a 
researcher is rejecting in the very act of labelling it such. This is of course precisely 
what Cohen was doing when he studied the media coverage of mods and rockers and 
when Young was studying the reaction to drug taking in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. Nevertheless, Cohen has come to feel uncomfortable with the blanket 
application of the term ‘panic’ to any study of reactions to deviance, as he wishes to 
engage with the possibility of ‘good’ moral panics (Cohen, 2002, pp. xxxi-xxxv).  
 
The question of what should be included within the rubric of the ‘moral’ within moral 
panic research is a pertinent one. In recent years, Cohen recognises that an expanding 
range of moral entrepreneurs have been successful in gaining media attention for new 
sets of issues and concerns. These issues include state crimes, corporate crime, 
feminist issues around gender inequalities in society, and environmental concerns 
(such as pollution and climate change). Cohen suggests these issues are actually 
legitimate topics about which concern should be expressed. That he also suggests that 
moral entrepreneurs have become ‘more like us’ (that is, highly educated, new middle 
class, anti-sexist, anti-racist, liberals rather than conservatives, old in every sense) 
chimes with his view that ‘we’ should find an increasing sympathy with their 
concerns. Cohen suggests these issues should be referred to as ‘good’ moral panics, a 
term which Critcher would consider an oxymoron. 
 
The notion of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ moral panics may be a useful heuristic with which to 
question assumptions about what is and is not a moral panic — to widen the scope of 
moral panic studies beyond those examples that are regarded by some as 
‘inappropriate’, ‘irrational’ reactions in need of debunking.  This could potentially go 
some way towards questioning the notion of irrationality, disproportionality, and other 
normative judgments that have been inherent to moral panic studies. 
 
At a deeper level, it might even be suggested that the very notion of ‘good’ moral 
panic is itself a construction designed to engender just such a moral panic.  Should 
‘we’ ‘good’ people not react with justifiable indignation to misrepresentations of 
underdogs and outsiders, those unable to speak for themselves, for whom ‘we’ believe 
ourselves to be standing up for, and on behalf of whom we react as the moral 
entrepreneurs? Critcher’s suggestion that we have witnessed the rise of a ‘culture of 
fear’, in which the media have increasingly come to frame news in terms of fear, cites 
a number of writers from across the political spectrum, from radicals and liberals to 
neo-conservatives who believe that liberal-elite doctrines of fear are political 
correctness, postmodernism, and/or health and safety regulation ‘gone mad’. Are we 
not invited to worry about such a culture of fear? Is this not itself an example of a 
‘good’ moral panic?  
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4. What are the Parameters of Moral Panics? 
 
It is interesting to note the continuities and the contrasts within the articles presented 
in this volume. Whilst general discussion ranges across a wide spectrum, the core 
objects of analysis are attempts to generate moral panics in relation to illegal drugs 
and violence (Young), sexual violence (Lumby & Funnell), benefit fraud 
(Lundström), sex and drugs (Jenks), intoxication (Critcher), and asylum seekers (both 
Cohen and Pearce & Charman). What these topics have in common is just how close 
they are to the topics that drew the attention of the earliest moral panic researchers to 
new deviancy research. Sex, drugs, and idleness, with the ever-present desire to blame 
outsiders for ‘our’ difficulties, have remained powerful triggers for igniting the moral 
indignation of a certain brand of conservative moral entrepreneur. And it is this brand, 
located predominantly in the ranks of conservative media commentators and policy 
makers, that appears to retain the attention of moral panic researchers today. This is 
despite the observation made by a number of contributors to this collection that the 
domain of panic discourse in a radically expanded media has come to include many 
previously unheard voices and to address new concern that may or may not best be 
incorporated under the same umbrella as the standard objects of moral concern 
(namely sex, intoxication, crime, and being some form of outsider). Critcher 
documents how a range of new anxieties have found a space within today’s media 
landscape. He shows that such concerns have done so because of the campaigning of 
particular special interest and lobby groups. He is, however, keen to preserve the 
distinction between moral panics and other media anxieties, both on the basis of 
defining the moral (to the exclusion of a range, though not the totality, of health and 
environmental issues) and over the question of panic potential (linked to the ability to 
mobilize reactions of one kind or another). Cohen, on the other hand, is less keen to 
limit the application of the term moral panic quite so strictly. Whilst he expresses 
agreement with Critcher on the need to define the term prior to researching it, he does 
not set out with such a strict set of presumptions as Critcher about the character of 
society’s overall power structure (see also Critcher, 2009). 
 
5. Continuity or Change? More or less morality, panics and/or fear? 
 
Jenks suggests that we have entered into a new era of individualization, an era in 
which a fear of freedom has been replaced by a fear of any kind of collective 
containment. The concept of moral panic, with its core set of concerns which 
challenge conservative (over)reactions to un-regulated behaviour that steps outside 
the bounds of traditional ideals of nation, family, community and enterprise — 
particularly when such behaviour involves sex, intoxication, indolence or immigration 
— can be seen as being tied to its origins in the late 1960s and early 1970s , a time 
when personal transgressions of  whatever kind were seen by the establishment as 
threatening  the fabric of society. For Jenks, today, the very idea that society exists, let 
alone that its fabric weaves us together in any essential fashion, is much less 
significant than it once was, and for him this changes the meaning of moral panics in 
a fundamental way. Thus contemporary outbreaks of moral indignation over the 
selfishness of particular individuals or groups can only ever be short lived since the 
very collective character of such mass indignation cannot be sustained in an 
environment of intense individualism. Not only is our attention lost when an issue 
does not affect us personally, but also collective engagement in such indignation soon 
peters out under such conditions.  
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A number of other authors in this issue note the rise of individualization, as described 
by writers such as Anthony Giddens (1992) and Ulrich Beck (1992), and use the 
language of ‘risk’ rather than ‘immorality’ inherited from this newer frame of 
reference. The extent to which this new language of risk is compatible with the notion 
of moral panics has been much debated (Ungar, 2001; Hier, 2003; see also Critcher, 
2003), but here it is necessary simply to point out a noteworthy contrast and parallel. 
When Cohen and Young first used the term moral panic to describe reactions to youth 
cultural transgressions four decades ago, as Cohen and Young themselves point out, 
very similar claims were being made about the breakdown of collective identities and 
the rise of selfish individualism. Moral panic theorists have long recognised the 
limited character of moral panics as attempts to hold together a collective order that is 
permanently proclaiming its own demise in the face of the ‘barbarians at the gates’. 
As such, the question of whether a decline in collectivity in general, and of moral 
collectivity in particular, represents a new reality or just an eternally recurring 
assumed reality remains an open one.  
 
Cohen suggests that moral panics appear to be on the increase, with more actors 
taking up the role of moral entrepreneur and more media space being made available 
to disseminating their views. Jenks suggests that such bursts of panic have become 
increasingly short lived. This creates more space for a proliferation of panics to occur 
in rapid succession. Critcher contrasts the success of the eighteenth century gin ruin 
panic in encouraging an array of acts of parliament aimed at limiting and regulating 
public houses and spirit production, with more recent attempts to foster a moral panic 
around ‘binge drinking’ in ‘booze Britannia’. The later proto-panic failed, it is 
suggested, because it ran up against too many powerful beneficiaries of the 24 hour 
alcohol-based economy. This suggests a shift from moral regulation to a purely 
financialized regulative structure, but Critcher also notes the rise of an increasingly 
shock-oriented media framing of news in a progressively competitive media market, 
particularly in the United States. In this kind of market driven news culture, fear sells 
copy and grabs eyeballs. Are attempts to incite fear always a form of moral panic? 
Does it make any sense to talk about a ‘non-moral panic’? Have we migrated from 
morality to risk or to fear, or is the question of how risk and fear are represented just 
as open to moral or non-moral framing as was the case a generation ago?  Fear of 
immigrants ‘taking our jobs’ and/or living off the back of ‘our’ hard work, just like 
our own home grown ‘benefit cheats’, suggests that it is quite possible for strongly 
moralized identities to be re-created around nationality and work-based identities, 
even if the elite/grass roots origins of such constructions of ‘us’ remain contested.  
 
6. Disproportionate Response? Essential Criteria or Unsustainable Concept? 
 
One of the defining characteristics of a moral panic, it might be thought, is the way in 
which  defining it  precisely as a panic strongly suggests that  it is an irrational and 
disproportionate response. Certainly the concept of disproportionality has formed a 
central tenet in almost all conceptions of moral panics and in distinguishing them 
from ‘legitimate’ public concerns. More recently, following writers such as 
Waddington (1986), some have begun to question whether moral panics must, by 
definition, involve responses that are irrational and disproportionate. And, on this 
basis, some have dismissed the concept altogether, while others have sought to 
reformulate the concept to address some of its normative connotations (Hier 2002a, 
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2008; Rohloff, 2011; Rohloff & Wright, 2010). Cohen, as we have already noted, has 
contributed to this debate in seeking to remove the stigma from the label moral panic, 
and in his suggesting the possibility of ‘good’ moral panics in which the concern 
expressed is regarded as legitimate and proportionate. As cases in point, we might 
consider state-sanctioned repression, torture, and genocide. In such cases, Cohen 
suggests, ‘we’ are not panicking enough, and perhaps even denying the existence of 
such issues ( Cohen, 2002, pp. xxxi-xxxv). In his article in this issue, Young goes 
further still in posing an awkward question for moral panic researchers concerning 
just how far they believe in the power of their own arguments. Young notes that the 
significance of folk-devils in the study of moral panics has thus far not been generally 
afforded the centrality which it deserves. Folk-devils are at the core of the conception 
and yet they have tended to receive far less attention than have those who define them 
as such. But perhaps this was for very good sociological and ethical reasons. Up until 
the time the concept of moral panic was originally developed, it was the definers who 
received very little attention, whilst the folk-devils themselves may have received far 
too much . Yet the concepts of deviance amplification and labelling, upon which the 
conception of moral panic theory grew, suggests that those labelled as ‘deviant’ might 
come to resemble the very label with which they were being tagged. By means of 
what Young calls the intimacy of other and otherer, alongside the intimacies of 
reproduction, resistance, and repression, the outsider/underdog, so labelled, pressed, 
limited, and channelled may well come to represent precisely the threat that the self-
appointed defenders of decency sought to warn of in the first place. Thus the initially 
irrational over-reaction to a supposed threat may eventually become proportionate  if 
those treated as folk-devils  do finally react in demonic fashion  
 
How far such a possibility might run is problematic for moral panic theory. For 
example it may well be the case that Lundström’s benefit recipients, given sufficient 
castigation for being lazy, and after sufficient insinuation that they are dishonest and 
criminally minded, might indeed, as classic ‘labelling’ theory suggests, come to 
accept such a definition of themselves  and become demoralized into a life outside the 
regimentation of paid employment. Pearce and Charman are careful to limit the 
suggestion that constant demonization of asylum seekers might have the effect of their 
being changed  by the very force which such a label might impose, yet nonetheless 
such a label can be said effectively to contain asylum seekers in a double-bind ‘trap’. 
In expressing a desire to work in the country in which they are claiming asylum, they 
face the distinct possibility of being represented as a threat to indigenous workers. 
Such a threat looms large, particularly at a time of rising unemployment and 
economic insecurity. And in so doing, asylum seekers effectively open themselves up 
to the charge that they are in fact primarily ‘economic migrants’ rather than political 
ones. On the other hand, if they follow the law and do not work, they are required to 
conform to the label of welfare dependents. 
 
7. Audience Effects/Media Change? 
 
That Lumby and Funnell are able to document various attempts to engage with moral 
panics from within the media itself in part reflects changes in media content, and the 
increased openness of mainstream media channels to a greater diversity of ‘expert’ 
voices. Angela McRobbie and Sarah Thornton (1995) point to the growing scale and 
diversification of media, the increasing need for content, and the greater choice 
available to audiences who are thereby able to switch over from channels that present 
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the world in a fashion they do not accept. Lumby’s position as both feminist academic 
and journalist is an exemplary illustration of McRobbie and Thornton’s point that 
moral panic messages are often challenged now from within the media itself, both 
within channels and between them. Nevertheless, as Lumby and Funnell note, this is 
not to say that powerful moral panic messages are not still manufactured and 
distributed.  
 
Quite how audiences react to such a new plurality of media voices is a crucial theme, 
and as a number of the authors in this special issue point out, moral panic researchers 
have too often neglected actual research into audience reactions, preferring instead to 
engage simply with media  texts and the responses of control agencies.  Pearce and  
Charman set out specifically to redress this imbalance in their investigation of the 
relationship between media representations and audience constructions of asylum 
seekers in the United Kingdom. What their research suggests is that mainstream 
media framing of the issue does appear to have a significant affect on the way in 
which audiences themselves frame the issue. Such effects take place at the level of 
specific forms of language and representation — particularly in relation to ‘their’ 
taking jobs, not taking jobs, rejecting ‘British culture’, and engaging in violent 
criminal behaviour. In such a fashion, asylum seekers are constructed, and come to be 
perceived, mainly as ‘illegitimate’ and a ‘problem’. Pearce and Charman conclude 
that on questions where audiences have little or no direct experience of the issue being 
presented to them in the media, it remains the case that media have a distinct capacity 
to foster disproportionate beliefs, fears, and indeed moral panic in audiences. Even 
their finding  that readers of different newspapers present different constructions of 
‘asylum seekers’ could be used as evidence of the power of the media, with 
newspapers which present positive or simply neutral images of asylum seekers 
producing positive or neutral impressions in their readers, and newspapers which  
present negative images similarly producing negative impressions. Equally, however, 
it could be argued that readers tend to choose newspapers whose views – and not 
simply on asylum seekers – concur with their own. This is an area urgently in need of 
further research – not simply within the ambit of moral panic theory but within the 
wider context of the role played by the media in the construction of social reality, an 
area which, curiously, remains significantly under-explored. Most sociologists today 
would probably reject a crude ‘hypodermic’ model of ‘media effects’ but would 
presumably not wish to go to the other extreme and assert that the media have no 
influence at all upon the way in which people think about their own society and the 
wider world. Jenny Kitzinger, a former member of the Glasgow Media Group, which 
contains some of the few academics who have attempted in any theoretically informed 
and empirically detailed fashion to ascertain the degree of this influence, puts it thus: 
 
Media power is certainly not absolute, nor does it exist in a vacuum, and audience reception is 
not an isolated encounter between an individual and a message. The media do not operate as a 
single force in a hermetically sealed ideological conspiracy. However, there can be a powerful 
interaction between media messages and broader contextual assumptions and the media still 
influence the way we think (1998: 211). 
 
Young notes that in his early writings he assumed a transition from pre-modern 
community to modern, urban, anomic fragmentation, in which individuals are isolated 
and therefore prone to the binding force of media influence un-mediated by wider 
social factors. Moral panic researchers have, for similar reasons, tended to assume 
that audiences are susceptible to relatively strong media influence, as a number of 
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authors in this collection serve to attest. Young, however, suggests that such a model 
of socially un-mediated influence is insufficient, and thus that we should attend to the 
complexity of audience reactions and interpretations. It is, therefore curious to note 
how current constructions of the individualization thesis, whilst paralleling older 
versions, also suggest the possibility that an individualized and de-moralized 
population, far from being more prone to reacting to moral panic discourse, may in 
fact remain unmoved. However, for the media to have an influence, the general 
population does not necessarily have to be ‘moved’. If the media and the actions of a 
few can be utilised to represent the opinions of the whole of the general public — as 
in the case of ‘penal populism’ — something can be presented as ‘popular’ or as 
representing ‘public opinion’ whether or not the population has ever really been 
engaged with the issue.  It is all a question of whose opinions are listened to, and by 
whom.  Newspapers habitually invoke ‘public opinion’ as backing their particular 
partisan causes, but this is an act of the purest ventriloquism: ‘public opinion’ on 
these occasions is quite simply whatever newspapers say it is. However, the crucial 
point here is that, in Britain at least, it is this  ‘opinion’ to which politicians and 
administrators are most sensitised and to which they are most likely to respond by 
framing policies and enacting legislation. What we have here, then, is less a circuit of 
communication, in which the press circulates distorted or indeed false stories and 
proposes reactionary solutions, the public believes the stories and endorses the 
solutions, and the state is then able to secure consent for actions which might 
otherwise appear unacceptably oppressive, than a symbiotic process involving, for the 
most part, just two sets of actors: the press and politicians.  In other words, it’s a 
short-circuit of communication. It is in this respect that Critcher has argued that ‘the 
media are an integral part of a “deviance-defining elite”’ (2003: 138), and that 
Richard Ericson et al claim that, outside this hermeneutic circle, ‘everyone else is left 
to watch, listen to or read the distant representations that form this symbolic 
spectacle’ (1987: 351). However, the extent to which publics react and policy 
reactions can be managed without some level of public ‘demand’, however contrived, 
remains an open question. Such complexity demands sustained empirical research, as 
no single universal model of moral panic will suffice.   
 
Whilst McRobbie and Thornton offer a relatively positive account of how a wider 
number and diversity of media channels have increased the scope for counter voices 
which are potentially capable of defusing conservative moral panic messages,  
Critcher observes that increased market competition between media outlets has also 
encouraged a ‘sound-bite’ culture in which the instant appeal of the ‘fear’ frame 
encourages the exaggerated, distorting, negative and confrontational reporting of 
issues. Rather than addressing whether concerns are warranted or not, significant 
sections of the media report merely the views of those who claim to be afraid of X, Y, 
or Z. An increased array of experts, counter-experts, victim support groups, and other 
advocacy and campaign groups ensures a never-ending supply of ‘news’ without the 
veracity of the claims ever being adequately checked. The resultant endless stream of 
fear-framed stories may or may not generate decisive reactions, whether amongst the 
public or by policy makers, but the influence of such stories may be more diffuse, 
reinforcing a general feeling of distrust and anxiety. That the proto-panic over ‘Booze 
Britain’ led to no new laws does not necessarily mean that the frame had no 
significant impact in a wider sense  
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8. What Counts as a Successful Moral Panic ? 
 
If the gin ruin stories of  200 years ago led to eight acts of parliament whilst ‘Booze 
Britain’ headlines did not lead to any legislative change, does this require us to 
conclude that the former was a ‘success’ whilst the later was a ‘failure’? In terms of 
standard moral panic theory, the short answer is a resounding ‘yes’. Cohen’s 1972 
account of mods and rockers set the trend in focusing attention  first upon media 
content and then upon correlating it with the reactions of the control agencies in 
passing new laws or extending old ones, or enforcing the latter more aggressively. As 
Critcher’s account of  the ‘culture or fear’ suggests, it may be that a more diffuse 
reaction might be defined as ‘success’ even if it does not generate clear and direct 
reactions in the form of policies and laws. As Pearce and Charman suggest, the 
‘success’ of scapegoating asylum seekers may be measured in the extent to which 
audiences think within the frames set out  by the media. Lundström’s account 
similarly suggests that media coverage may be significant in influencing audiences, 
and this too might be deemed a ‘success’.  
 
Yet, ‘success’ is increasingly slippery as a term in conditions in which older 
assumptions about the relative coherence of media, audiences, and control agencies 
are less widely held. If, as McRobbie and Thornton suggest, alternative voices can 
challenge traditional moral entrepreneurs in a more diverse media landscape, might 
the ‘failure’ of one moral panic be evidence of the ‘success’ of attempts to generate 
concern about it by others? For instance, as Lumby and Funnell describe in their 
article, Lumby was accused of trying to label others as moral panic mongers in media 
debates over sexual assaults by Australian rugby players. Where she found more 
success, however, was in identifying common ground (in her identification of herself 
as a mother) with ‘child protection’ moral entrepreneurs in debates over the alleged 
‘sexualization’ of girls in art and the wider media. Identifying herself as a mother, 
Lumby was able to reject the moral panic discourse of alleged sexualisation whilst 
avoiding the claim that a defence of artistic freedom was somehow the same as an 
indifference towards the needs of children. The example serves to highlight how, in 
certain contexts, neutralization of a moral panic might be defined as success. Lumby’s 
engagement within the media debate may be said to have succeeded if it contributed 
to neutralizing a panic and subsequent legislation or policy.  
 
As several authors in this special issue note, the number of candidates for moral panic 
status appears to be on the increase, even as their character as moral and/or as 
generating intense reactions at any number of levels of social action (for example, 
individual, collective, and legal) appears to be in decline. Perhaps, more panics simply 
cancel out one another. Or perhaps counter-experts who are deemed not to be 
‘peddling’ panics are making themselves heard more. Alternatively, perhaps 
individualization has robbed moral panic discourses of their assumed force since they 
simply take their place on the conveyor belt of infotainment that has become 
characteristic of today’s media marketplace. Another alternative is that it may now be 
easier to distinguish between those panic invitations that are maintained and acted 
upon and those that do not chime with deeper concerns. The perennial themes of sex, 
idleness, criminality, and outsiders appear more readily able to mobilize sustained 
moral panics. Polluters, bankers, corrupt politicians, and the sexual exploitation of 
women have emerged onto the media agenda, but arguably do not sustain themselves 
in the same way. The question remains of whether such new themes can be defined as 
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successful moral panic topics in the way that previous themes established themselves. 
As a case in point, intoxication has been a staple in the canon of moral indignation, 
but appears ostensibly to have declined in prominence over the course of recent 
decades. Arguably, the language has shifted in line with the changing status of 
intoxication as it has become increasingly understood and framed within discourses of 
health and individual responsibility as opposed to discourses of morality. Thus, it may 
perhaps be more productive to understand intoxication not so much as a declining 
concern, but as a shifting one. Moreover, morality itself is not a monolithic 
unchanging constant but is itself continually re-negotiated, particularly in relation to 
the competing domains of moral and medical concerns. 
 
9. Moral Panic Theory as/and Intervention 
 
Lumby and Funnell’s article in this collection is the most explicit example of moral 
panic research as direct intervention in the media representation of a number of issues. 
As has been noted above, the act of intervention requires the identification of points 
of entry into a particular debate and the acceptance of elements of existing ‘common 
ground’ within the debate, even if this means suspending certain constructionist 
dispositions characteristic of moral panic researchers. This tension between an 
implicit political orientation towards the underdog and the explicit social 
constructionism that might otherwise tend towards relativism is identified by Cohen 
as central to the symbolic interactionist sociology of Becker, Lemert, Kitsuse, and 
Goffman from whose work Cohen’s own ideas about moral panics were first 
developed. The differences that emerged over the subsequent decades over the 
political standpoint from which ‘committed’ moral panic theorists intervened are 
highlighted in this collection in the different approaches to the question taken by 
Jenks, Cohen, Young, Critcher, Lundström, Pearce & Charman, as well as by Lumby 
& Funnell. Liberal constructionists, more detached social researchers, investigative 
journalists, and radical critics of capitalism, have all constructed different standpoints.  
 
It is perhaps surprising to think that, whilst becoming increasingly adopted by 
sections of the media, the term moral panic has also become bound up with the 
political interventions of neo-conservatives, as documented in Critcher’s account of 
those who argue that ‘liberal elites’ have pressed ‘political correctness’, post-
modernism, human rights, identity politics, health and safely, and 
litigation/compensation culture beyond ‘reasonable’ (conservative) bounds of 
‘common sense’. It is worth noting that similar critiques of such a culture of fear also 
come from the allegedly radical left. At the same time, Cohen and others in this 
collection suggest that wider media access has allowed ‘good’ moral panics to be 
fostered by environmentalists, feminists, and other voices that were formerly more 
marginalised.  
 
 
10. Moral Panics Without Devils? 
 
As can be seen in his article in this issue, Lundström identifies a key contrast between 
British and Swedish accounts of welfare ‘cheats’. In the British press, significant 
attention is given to individual cases. The more lurid and outrageous the story can be 
made to be, the more space newspapers will devote to it. In short, significant sections 
of the British press are very keen to construct individual welfare ‘cheats’ as folk 
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devils, personifications of all that is wrong and wrong with contemporary British  
society.  In Sweden, on the other hand, there appears to be reluctance to personalize 
stories about welfare ‘cheating’. Instead, stories focus upon institutions, the overall 
loss to the state budget and to society, as well as the conditions that appear to have 
encouraged or condoned such actions, and which may be seen as indicative of a 
general failing in the wider society. The Swedish press, it appears, has not created 
folk devils out of ‘benefit cheats’. This is despite the fact that the Swedish press 
appears more prone to intense periods of coverage of the topic relative to the British. 
However,  Lundström’s research leads one to conclude that these differences in 
reporting arise largely from the differences between the British and Swedish national 
press, the former predominantly liberal and the latter overwhelmingly conservative 
and frequently decidedly illiberal. It is thus not particularly surprising that the former 
has managed to discuss the issue of benefit ‘cheating’ without creating folk-devils 
whereas the latter has succeeded in creating folk devils without managing to shed 
much light on the societal and structural reason for such behaviour. The finding with 
regard to the Swedish press brings into focus an issue addressed by a number of 
authors: that of whether contemporary moral panics have less need for ‘folk devils’ as 
concerns are increasingly directed towards diffuse issues which are in some ways 
‘depersonalised’. It would follow, then, that as the correlate of an increased diffusion 
of moral entrepreneurship, the distinction between the righteous and the rest 
diminishes. ‘We’ might just as easily be enraged as ashamed, and on some issues, 
such as climate change, we may very well find it hard to discern which we should 
feel, if not both at the same time. Is such ambiguity new? The very notion of a folk-
devil, in the creation of a scapegoat who is driven out is designed to exorcise an evil 
within us, suggests the relationship between a diffuse ‘evil’ and the need to have it 
embodied in some identifiable target is not as simple as now and then.  
 
What the Devil?  
 
The theory of moral panic has straddled the fault lines between general explanation 
and particular description, between radical constructionism and structural theories of 
power in society, between a picture of social fragmentation and an account of the 
maintenance of moral order. Clearly, moral panic researchers draw from a range of 
different theoretical traditions and backgrounds. However, such researchers tend, but 
not universally so, to have in common a critical social science approach to 
challenging power, a humanist orientation to the co-construction of social relations 
through meaningful interaction, an interventionist approach to changing rather than 
simply describing social reality, and a qualitative interest in cultural interpretation. 
This critical, humanist, interventionist, and largely qualitative approach to social 
science and society, whilst creating much scope for dispute and disagreement, has 
also been highly productive, especially in recent years, when there has been 
increasing dialogue between those who disagree, and efforts have been made to 
develop connections and to reconcile differences. Whilst disputes concerning the 
meaning and limits of the terms ‘moral’ and ‘panic’ have led to sharp differences and 
a degree of isolation between emerging perspectives, more recent engagements 
between camps have shown how the open-ended character of the concept of moral 
panic, something that has caused much difficulty and confusion in the past, may be 
taken in more creative directions in the future. The power of the term has resided as 
much in this concept’s ability to provoke challenges to taken for granted ways of 
seeing, as it has in providing a unified way to view the world. Questions concerning 
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the relationship between panics and normality, the scope of anti-elite panics, ‘good’ 
panics, the limits of the moral, continuity or change, disproportionality, audience 
effects and media diversification, notions of success, intervention, and the idea of 
panics without devils, highlight the diversity within moral panic studies, as  this 
Introduction has made abundantly clear. Nevertheless, the foregoing account of key 
sites of dispute also highlights powerful continuities across time and between authors.  
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